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SELF DEFENCE AND NATIONAL DEFENCE1
I
Since the early eighnes moral philosophical concern with issues of war and peace 
has soared Most of that concern has found an outlet m the ethics of nuclear deterrence and 
comparatively little attenuon has been devoted to the moral justification of conventional 
warfare 2 Authors who have broached the latter subject at all have mostly elaborated on 
established positions such as chnsuan just war thinking and its mam rivals pacifism and 
political realism The debates on the topic have consequently been confined to a rather 
narrow framework and not spawned much philosophical innovation
Therefore this paper wants to explore a new avenue for understanding the morality 
of war Specifically it investigates the ethics of self defence and its implications for the 
moral justification of nauonal defence The rationale behmd that investigation is an obvious 
one If there is one view on which the opmions of moral and political philosophers tend to 
converge it is the view that self defensive behavior whether by individuals or by nations 
is morally superior to aggressive behavior Self defence thus possesses an aura of 
respectability that seems to render it eminendy suitable as a rallying pomt for agreement on 
the ethical legitimacy of warfare 3
Before investigating whether such agreement is possible section II of this paper 
will address the question how and to what extent individual self defence is morally 
jusnfied Then section HI wul investigate the relevance of that answer for the justification 
of national defence It should be observed that in both sections the discussion will be 
limited to one type of self defensive act, namely killing m response to a threat to 
one s life Therefore the last part of the paper will look at which other types of self 
defensive acts bear relevance to the justification of defensive warfare
II
If one s life is threatened by an aggressor and if the only way to save one s life is to 
kill the aggressor most people would agree that one is justified m taking the life of the 
aggressor In fact this particular case seems to constitute the core meaning of morally 
justified self defence 4 Put more correctly on the assumption that self defence is 
sometimes morally jusnfied. killing in self defence when that is the only opnon available 
for saving one s life seems to be the pre eminent instance of morally justified lethal self 
defence
Yet the question anses how it is that killing in self defence can be morally justified 
given the fact that as a rule killing is not morally justified but, on the contrary the kind of 
act that helps us understand the meaning of moral wrongness What m other words is so 
special about killing m self defence that allows one to ovemde a fundamental moral rule 
and get away with lt9^  ;
The most direct answer to that question is that killing m self defence is a response 
to a threat to one s life while other forms of killing are not and that therefore the former 
but not the latter types of killing are morally justified. However m some cases killing m 
response to a threat to one s life doesn t seem morally justified at all Suppose my life is 
threatened by an aggressor who I subsequently try to kill in order to save my life The 
moment I try to kill my aggressor his or her life is threatened by me Nonetheless no one 
is likely to argue that at that particular urne the aggressor acquires a moral permit to kill me 
Hence the mere presence of a threat to a person s life cannot be a sufficient justification for 
killing in self defence
In order to make the justification sufficient one could suggest that a threat to one s 
life warrants the killing of others only when one is not responsible for bringing about that 
threat The relationship between an aggressor and a victim should from that perspective 
be regarded as asymmetrical m that the aggressor is responsible and the victim is not m 
bringing about a situation m which the victim has no other choice than to threaten the life of 
the aggressor Since the aggressor intentionally and willingly brings about a situation in 
which there exists a high nsk that he or she will have to kill another person in order to save 
his or her life the aggressor cannot claim to be acting in self defense His or her self 
defense the argument concludes is m this case no more than a pretext for murder The 
problem with this argument is that it merely shows why the aggressor cannot claim to act in 
self defence However the fact that aggressors cannot defend the morality of their 
aggression does not yet justifv the self defensive aggression of the victim It indicates that 
one type of aggression is worse in moral terms than other types of aggression but that is 
hardlv a revelation The quesnon thus remains how can killing m self defence be morally 
justified given the fact that it is not justified in other situations9
A popular approach for answering this question is to invoke a counterfactual 
explanation that is an explanation that makes clear why it cannot be the case that self 
defence is not morally justified One such explanation is offered by Fonon and Elfstrom 
Killing in self defence thev sav is permissible because of the anxiety and insecurity that 
would result if one s life could be taken at any time for any reasons and also because of 
the deterrence it provides against aggressive acts 6 As an explanation of whv most 
societies condone killing in self defence this argument is convmcing However the
explanatory force of the argument does not guarantee its adequateness as a moral 
justification There are at least two reasons why we should m fact doubt its moral 
adequateness The first one is that the argument can too easily be expanded in order to 
justify other acts of killing For example psychological security might be enhanced and 
aggressive acts further deterred by not only permitting killing m self defence when one s 
life is threatened but by equally condoning it when one s legal property rights or privacy 
rights are violated Yet we are not inclined to regard this as a sufficient reason for thinking 
that killing m order to defend one s property or pnvacy is morally justified. Even if we 
would in some cases condone killing in defence of property or pnvacy we would 
definitely want to preserve a moral difference between such cases and cases of killing in 
defence of one s life Now the problem with the argument under discussion is that it 
cannot do so for it is not concerned with the wrongness of the aggressive acts to which 
rules permitting self defensive killing are a response to but only with the social effects of 
the rules themselves As David Wasserman has put it the weakness of the argument is that 
it rests the victim s nght to protect himself from deadly aggression on contingencies 
unrelated to the victim s innocence or the aggressor s culpability ^
Another problem with the counterfactual explanation is that it cannot offer a 
personal moral justification for self defensive killing If a person is confronted with the 
choice of either killing an aggressor or taking the nsk of being killed by an aggressor the 
course of action that he or she will choose will generally not affect the public s belief that 
the moral permissibility of killing in self defence has a deterrent effect. In that particular 
case and in many other similar cases the choice to kill the aggressor will in all 
likelihood not enhance the general utility of morally condonmg the killing of an aggressor 
m self defence Given this fact and given the fact that killing is as a rule morally wrong it 
is not clear that a victim should feel justified in killing an aggressor m self defence Put 
differently if killing m self defence is justified only because of the beneficial effects of 
adopting a rule that allows such acts it does not seem to follow that it is justified m the case 
thatforegomg the option of self defensive killing would not affect the general acceptance 
and credibility of that rule For then the reason that justifies self defensive killing is absent 
so that self defensive killing itself is no longer morally permissible
The two justifications for self defensive killing that have been brought forward so 
far prove to be unsuccessful The first justification the one that rests its case on the 
responsibility of the aggressor shows that the aggressor s behavior is morally wrong 
but not that the victim s behavior is morally nght The second justification turns out to be 
too permissive towards self defensive killing as a rule and too restrictive towards self 
defensive killing as a personal choice option Both justifications seem to fail because they
take too little account of the specificity of the victim s situation The first justification 
focuses on the aggressor and the second on the utility of social rules but neither 
concentrates on the position of the moral agent that is confronted with the choice between 
killing and the nsk of being killed
One philosopher who does focus on the victim s situation is Thomas Hobbes 
According to Hobbes when human beings are confronted with the options of killing or 
risking to be killed their natural propulsion towards self preservauon requires them to kill 
Since human beings cannot be blamed for what then- nature impels them to do killing m 
self defence must be Hobbes concludes morally permissible 8 If one accepts Hobbes 
premise namely that we have a natural propulsion towards self preservation one can 
hardlv object to his conclusion Of course his premise is difficult to square with the 
existence of phenomena such as suicide and self sacrifice and therefore Hobbes 
argument is ultimately deficient Yet, it also contains a grain of truth m that we often view 
cases of self defensive killing as cases in which the victim could not have acted otherwise 
We tend to assume that the presence of a threat to one s life creates an emotional stram that 
obfuscates any attempt at reasoned deliberation concerning what to do m the face of that 
threat In other words we incline to accept Hobbes view that self defensive killing is a 
course of action that is the product of situational constraints rather than of personal 
deliberation
Although I see no reason to take exception to that view it does not solve the 
problem of the morality of self defensive killing While it may be true that self defensive 
killing is often determined by situational constraints one can imagine situations m which 
these constraints are largely absent and m which persons could deliberately decide to give 
up their lives instead of taking the lives of their aggressors Would it m that case be best to 
do so or would it make no moral difference what is done and would it therefore be 
morallv permissible to kill the aggressors9 What in other words would m this case be a 
morally justified 
choice9
Fairness seems to demand that one does not favor the life of one person to the life 
of another unless there is a morally relevant difference between both persons Hence if 
there were no relevant moral difference between the victim and the aggressor and either the 
aggressor or the victim would have to die it might not be morally justified to take the 
aggressors life As a matter of fact though there is a morally relevant difference In the 
case under consideration The fact that a choice has to be made between killing one person 
and letnng another person get killed is itself the result of a choice by the aggressor Had the 
aggressor not made that choice that is had the aggressor not threatened the life of the
victim no choice between the lives of the aggressor and the victim would have had to be 
made Since whatever choice that is made will result in someone s death either the victim s 
or the aggressor s the fact that a person will get killed does not result from the victim 
choosing one course of action rather than another but from the very fact that the victim is 
forced to make a choice And since it is the aggressor who forces the victim to make a 
choice the aggressor is ultimately responsible for the fact that someone will get killed For 
that reason the victim cannot be blamed for killing the aggressor m self defence By killing 
the aggressor the victim does not incur any responsibility for having killed someone but 
merely makes the aggressor take responsibility for his or her act by letting him or her bear 
the act s inevitable effects In other words the fact that the victim can deliberate on which 
course of action to take does not affect the moral permissibility of self defensive killing As 
long as victims are m a situation in which they cannot but choose between killing their 
aggressors and being killed bv them they are under no moral obligation to refrain from 
killing their aggressors
One might observe here that there is one significant exception to this rule namely 
cases in which the aggressors bear no responsibility for their aggression In these cases the 
victims lives are threatened by material aggressors or innocent threats that is persons 
who by acting m a certain way pose unawares and through no fault of their own a serious 
and immediate threat to another person s life Since innocent threats are m no way 
responsible for who will be killed it might be considered unfair to kill them instead of 
being killed by them for m the former but not m the latter case one favors one s own life 
without there bemg any morally relevant difference between the two lives 9 Yet to 
conclude that the victim should not kill the aggressor seems also unfair for the victim is no 
more than the aggressor responsible for what happens Susan Levine has therefore 
suggested that in this case onlv a decision by chance such as a toss up can be considered 
fair 10
Although this solunon is technically speaking attractive there is something 
intuitively repulsive about deciding between life and death on the basis of a toss up The 
reason that we have this intuition is I suspect that we are not prepared to accept that if the 
results of one way of acting are morally identical to the results of another way of acting it 
can make a moral difference how one arrives at the decision to act one way rather than 
another Susan Levine correctlv assumes that fairness demands from us that we base moral 
decisions not on personal preferences but on the morally relevant characteristics of the 
situation That does not imply though that if the morally relevant characteristics of the 
situation do not give us anv clue for how to act it is immoral to rely on our personal 
preferences to make the decision In such a case it makes no sense anymore to talk about a
moral decision for everything moral about the situation proved to be insufficient to make a 
decision In short if there is no moral difference between one person rather than another 
getting killed and if at least either of two persons will get killed, one is under no obligation 
to kill the one rather than the other person if one happens to be either of these two persons 
The fact that neither of the two persons is morally responsible for the situation they are m 
makes it a tragic situation but that in itself need not affect the moral permissibility of self 
defensive killing 1 *
In sum self defensive killing by a person X is morally justified if three conditions 
obtain (1) X is together with at least one other person in a situauon m which one of the 
persons will be killed through actions of the other person(s) (2) X is not responsible for 
bringing about that situation (3) unless X kills another person X him or herself will be 
killed
III
Michael Dummet has observed that it is not humanly possible for individual 
soldiers or officers commanding platoons companies battalions or armies to abide by or 
refer to the principle of self defence ^  For this reason he continues mies of war were 
introduced that could be applied more mechanically so long as a state of war existed, one 
might kill members of the enemy forces m uniform unless they were surrendering or had 
surrendered Dummet is obviously nght in pomting out the irrelevance m wartime of a 
narrowly defined principle of self defence However if self defensive killing is justified 
so must other defensive killing Suppose for instance that in each of the cases 
discussed the victim was accompanied by another person and that it was this person and 
not the victim who killed the aggressor in order to save the victim s life This would not 
make the killing of the aggressor any less justified if at least neither the victim nor the 
person who killed the aggressor were responsible for bringing about the situauon which 
resulted in the killing of the aggressor
If the principle of self defence is viewed as one that justifies self defensive as well 
as other defensive killing it is no longer liTelevant for warume situauons The principle 
then implies one could argue that it is morally permissible to kill members of the enemy 
forces in uniform unless they are surrendering or have surrendered For m wartime soldiers 
are repeatedly confronted with situauons m which their own lives and the lives of their 
comrades are threatened bv acuons of the enemy forces since such imminent threats can 
only be averted by killing the enemy soldiers that pose the threats killing these enemy 
soldiers is a case of justified self and other defensive killing Enemy soldiers that are
surrendering or have surrendered cannot be justifiably killed though for they no longer 
pose an immediate threat to anyone s life
The problem with this argument is that though it is true that combat situations mav 
be situations in which killing cannot be avoided it does not follow that nobody can be 
blamed for the killing If I voluntarily enter a combat situation without this being necessary 
to save my own life or the life of others and if as a result of my actions someone gets 
killed I cannot claim to act in self or other defence On the contrary I will be to blame for 
this killing even if viewed from within the context of the combat situation the killing was 
a response to a threat to my life
One could observe here that the only instances in which people enter combat 
situations without this being necessary to save their own lives or the lives of others are 
instances of blatant military aggression i e the kind of military aggression that nobody 
considers to be morally justified anyway If this is so the above argument does not 
invalidate the moral justification of defensive military action but rather strengthens it by 
setting defensive military action clearly apart from military aggression
However one can question whether entering combat situations is ever necessary to 
save lives It is of course possible that by entering a combat situation and killing enemy 
soldiers I indirectly save the lives of those who otherwise might have been killed by these 
enemy soldiers Yet it does not follow that my entering a combat situation was necessary 
to save anyone s life For the enemy soldiers that I killed might have got killed without my 
interference Also the enemy soldiers that I killed might not have killed other soldiers 
anyway even had they survived. And if they had killed other soldiers had they survived 
their demise may not save these other soldiers for the latter might now get killed by other 
enemv soldiers All in all then I cannot reasonably claim that my contribution or anyone 
else s contribution for that matter to combat situations is necessary to save lives
The obvious objection to this line of reasoning is that it misunderstands the nature 
of military operations and the role of individuals within these operations Military actions 
even if thev have a purely defensive character and are ultimately aimed at avoiding 
massacres cannot operate under the rule that each individual soldier should try to save the 
life of other individual soldiers If military commanders would implement such a rule thev 
would be heading for a speedy defeat Since them goal is at the very least to ward of 
aggression they have to order their soldiers to make use of force m a way that optimally 
achieves that goal
Does this military necessity imply that the conduct of soldiers is necessarily at odds 
with peace time morality9 Military strategists such as Clausewitz have argued that it 
does 13 The possibility remains though that the behavior of soldiers can indirectly be
morallv justified. While individual soldiers cannot justifiably claim that their participation in 
a military operation is necessary for saving lives of other soldiers they can claim that the 
military operation itself is necessary to save lives More specifically they can claim that a 
military operation is morally justified provided that the bloodshed it causes is significantly 
and predictably more limited than the bloodshed that would result if the operation were not 
earned out In order to find out to what extent this pnnciple can justify actual military 
operations a hypothetical case should be considered
Suppose the Soviet Union suddenly fulfills the expectations of Western military 
planners and launches a grand scale invasion of West Germany Clearly whatever the 
NATO response to the invasion may be the Soviet Union is m this case fully and solely 
responsible for its military aggression In addition one might claim the Soviet Union is 
also responsible for all the immediate and future effects of its military aggression including 
the eventual civilian casualties of the invasion For if the Soviet Umon had not invaded 
West Germany these effects would not have occurred On the other hand the precise 
nature of these effects will varv depending on how the Western Alliance reacts to the 
invasion so that the latter s responsibility will vary accordingly If for instance NATO 
would respond to the invasion by using its tactical nuclear weapons it has to bear the 
responsibility for doing so To be sure the Soviet Union knowingly took the nsk that 
NATO would respond in this manner to its invasion of West Germany and m this sense it 
is also partly responsible for NATO s decision to go nuclear The moral responsibility of 
the Soviet Union does not however cancel out the moral responsibility of NATO It is not 
because the Soviet Union acts in a morally irresponsible way by invading West Germany 
that it makes no moral difference how NATO reacts to that invasion On the contrary the 
moralitv of that reacnon has to be judged independently from the morality of what it is a 
reaction to
Defensive military operations are morally justified Suggested onlv if the 
bloodshed that they cause is predictably and significantly less than the bloodshed that 
would result if the operations were not earned out Given that rule it is questionable 
whether putting up a militarv defence against a Soviet invasion would be the morally 
desirable course of action A Soviet occupation of Western Europe might be harsh but it is 
doubtful whether it would result in more bloodshed than turning Germany into a battlefield 
Yet to conclude that it is morally best to leave Europe defenseless does not sound quite 
nght either The reason seems to be that one cannot predict the nature of a Soviet 
occupation On the basis of our knowledge of the current Soviet regime one would not 
expect this occupation to be especially cruel But then we also hardly expect this regime to 
take the decision to invade West Germany We would rather expect such a move from a
Stalinist regime that is the kind of regime that is homble to the extent that opposing it 
militarily would have consequences that may be benign in comparison with the 
consequences of bearing its dominance Hence a military defence of West Germany could 
be justified after all m view of the considerable nsks that foregoing such a defence might 
imply
Nonetheless it does not follow that the policv of maintaining a strong military 
defence apparatus in West Germany should be continued ad infinitum In order for such a 
pokcv to be morally preferable it would have to be the only available option apart from 
leaving West Germany defenseless in the face of the threat of a Soviet invasion This kind 
of option it is defimtelv not. Military force reductions in the framework of agreements on 
such reductions between the NATO and WTO countries could be pursued more vigorously 
and successfully than thev have been m the past Theoretically at least they could result m 
the near total demilitarization of the border area between the NATO and WTO blocs and 
consequently effectuate a considerable lessening of tensions between both blocs
Even if one abstracts from the possibility of mutual disarmament though the 
option of maintaining a strong military presence in West Germany is not desirable The 
reason is that it overlooks the possibility of opposing military aggression by putting up a 
non military defence For instance the implementation of a civilian based nonviolent 
defence would definitely result m much less bloodshed than any other conceivable military 
defence system The problem is of course that civilian based defence systems have until 
now not been tested on an organized and large scale so that their chances for success are as 
a rule regarded with considerable skepticism Since it is impossible to refute that skepticism 
in a few pages it suffices to observe that it would be at least desirable to further investigate 
the potential of civilian based defence 14
The argument so far indicates that military operations are morally justifiable if there 
are no alternatives to executing them that would save more lives This makes it doubtful 
whether national defence as it is currently understood can be justified m terms of the ethics 
of self defensive killing However this conclusion is predicated on the assumption that 
self defensive killing is onh morallv permissible if someone s life is threatened Because 
many people believe that self defensive killing is also a justifiable response to other types 
of aggression such as the infliction of severe physical or mental harm and the taking away 
of one s freedom one could argue that going to war need not save more lives than not 
going to war in order to be justified For instance one may consider warfare also justified 
if it is the best way to preserve the freedom of individuals within a country
The argumentative basis of this view seems to be that some personal fates are as 
bad or even worse than getting lolled and that therefore self defensive killing is morally
permissible if it is the only way to ward off such fates as morally permissible as killing m 
defense of one s life As a general rule one might say that such fates will roughly coincide 
with situations that produce unbearable suffering For presumably people prefer death to a 
life characterized by unbearable suffering but do not prefer death to a life characterized bv 
bearable suffering For the purposes of this argument it is unnecessary to spell out the exact 
meaning of the notions bearable and unbearable suffering It suffices to observe that as 
long as situations offer the possibility for some kind of resistance the suffering that they 
produce will not be unbearable The reason is that the possibility for resistance is tied up 
with the presence of hope for a better future and that, as long as there is such hope 
suffering can be endured In other words it is arguable that as long as situations offer 
options for nonlethal resistance they confront the victim with a fate that is not as bad as 
bemg killed and that such situations do therefore not provide a moral justification for 
self defensive killing
It is doubtful whether in view of this conclusion warfare m order to protect the 
freedom of individuals is morallyjusnfied. To be sure individuals who are faced with the 
prospect of entirely loosing their freedom and who have no other way to preserve their 
freedom than to kill their aggressors are justified m doing so For if they would loose their 
freedom entirely they could per definition have to abandon all resistance However the 
fact that not even the most totalitarian regimes in history have been able to suppress 
completelv all resistance indicates that situations m which people are faced with a total loss 
of freedom are rare The reason why such situations are rare is that even totalitarian regimes 
depend for their survival on the willingness of people to comply with their dictates hence 
people always have the opnon of resisting the regime by disobeying its dictates Only when 
the regime is intent on exterminating part of its population does this opnon for resistance 
disappear But then of course self defensive killing is jusnfied as much because of the 
threat of the loss of lives as because of the threat of the total loss of freedom In other 
words it is quite likely that when wars are justified because they prevent the loss of 
freedom they will be the kind of wars that are already justified because they will save 
lives
IV
This paper set out with the suggesnon that the aura of respectability that surrounds 
the notion of self defence ma\ render that noüon suitable as a rallying point for agreement 
on the ethical legitimacy of warfare It is questionable though that the argument m this 
paper will foster such agreement Its conclusions are pacifist to an extent that most
proponents of national defence would find unpalatable It is therefore necessary to 
observe that this paper cannot claim to have proven current national defence policies to be 
immoral There may well be other grounds for justifying such policies than the moral 
permissibility of individual self defensive killing The purpose of this paper was not to 
provide a final verdict on the morality of national defence but to investigate the claim that 
the morality of national defence is based on the morality of individual self defence Given 
the current strongly military conception of national defence this claim can receive no more 
than weak support For if killing in national defence is only justified if there are no 
alternatives to doing so that would save more lives it will in practice very seldom be found 
morally acceptable
12
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